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The Effect of Various Police 
Enforcement Actions on 
Violent Crime: Evidence 
From a Saturation Foot-
Patrol Intervention
Eric L. Piza1
Abstract
The current study tests the crime prevention effect of different police actions 
conducted during a foot-patrol saturation initiative in Newark, New Jersey. Police 
actions were categorized into two typologies: enforcement actions (i.e., arrests, 
quality of life summonses and field interrogations) and guardian actions (i.e., business 
checks, citizen contacts, bus checks, and taxi inspections). Logistic regression models 
tested the effect of enforcement and guardian actions on crime during daily (i.e., 
24-hr) periods as well as the intervention’s operational (6:00 p.m.-2:00 a.m.) and 
nonoperational (2:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m.) periods. Analyses were conducted twice, once 
for the Operation Impact target area and once for a surrounding catchment zone (to 
measure spatial displacement). Findings suggest that guardian actions had a greater 
crime prevention effect than enforcement actions on crime occurrence. Policy 
implications of the findings are discussed.
Keywords
crime and place, foot patrol, police enforcement, hot spots policing, guardianship
Introduction
While traditional police activities can be classified as largely reactive, recent decades 
have seen increased emphasis on proactive strategies incorporating high levels of 
focus and a diversity of approaches (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). This change in mission 
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has resulted in the emergence of police strategies with significant evidence of effec-
tiveness, with the strongest evidence found for geographically focused police practices 
(Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2014; Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 
2004). While there is general consensus on the effectiveness of geographically focused 
practices, namely hot spots policing, much less is known regarding the precise actions 
police officers should take when engaged in such practices.
There is general agreement that proactive police actions generate greater crime con-
trol benefits than the predominately reactive standard model of policing. However, 
police proactivity is not a singular action, but rather includes a “wide gamut of activi-
ties” (Wu & Lum, 2016, pp. 1-2). On one hand, proactivity can take the form of formal 
enforcement actions such as arrests, summonses, or field interrogation tactics (Piza, 
Caplan, Kennedy, & Gilchrist, 2015; Rosenfeld, Deckard, & Blackburn, 2014; Sherman 
& Rogan, 1995b). On the other hand, police could affect crime through their visual 
presence in hot spots and informal engagement with residents, relying less on punitive 
enforcement (Nagin, Solow, & Lum, 2015; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Telep, Mitchell, 
& Weisburd, 2014). Little is known regarding which of these types of proactivity most 
directly affects crime occurrence. This is an important gap in the literature for several 
reasons. First, despite observed typologies of police practices (e.g., Hot Spots Policing, 
Problem-Oriented Policing, etc.), individual interventions can vary greatly in terms of 
police officer enforcement expectations. Second, police officers are afforded a great 
deal of discretion in addressing public safety concerns, with a number of enforcement 
options typically available in any given situation. For these reasons, knowing the spe-
cific officer actions that maximize program effect can greatly inform police strategy.
The current study contributes to the literature by testing the crime prevention effect 
of various police officer enforcement actions during the Newark, New Jersey Police 
Department’s (NPD) Operation Impact, a foot-patrol saturation initiative. Police 
actions were categorized into two typologies: official “enforcement actions” and less 
punitive, more informal “guardian actions.” Logistic regression models tested whether 
these enforcement typologies differentially affected violent crime levels in target and 
catchment areas. Findings on the relative effect of various enforcement actions can 
have important implications for the design and implementation of geographically 
focused police strategies. Specifically, such findings can help police determine whether 
traditional law enforcement activities can be de-emphasized in favor of less invasive 
actions, which may help strike a balance between crime prevention and fostering posi-
tive police/community relations. This issue is particularly salient in the current study 
setting of Newark, as a recent investigation conducted by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) found that aggressive enforcement activities disproportionately affected minor-
ity communities and impinged upon civil liberties in certain contexts (U.S. Department 
of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2014).
Review of Relevant Literature
Contemporary policing has seen an increased understanding of the programs and prac-
tices that effectively prevent crime and disorder. The National Academy of Sciences’ 
Piza 3
Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices systematically reviewed 
policing studies in response to the U.S. DOJ’s considerable investment in law enforce-
ment practice and research under the 1994 crime act (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). The 
committee concluded that highly focused interventions at crime hot spots “provide the 
strongest collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available” (Skogan & 
Frydl, 2004, p. 250) with a recent systematic review and meta-analysis providing fur-
ther support for hot spots policing (Braga et al., 2014).
The effect of hot spots policing is contextualized through a comparison with the 
standard model of police practice, which emphasizes reactive responses to crime and 
rigid adherence to traditional law enforcement tools, such as random patrol, rapid 
response, and retroactive investigations (Skogan & Frydl, 2004). Hot spots policing 
conversely emphasizes the proactive disruption of crime and disorder by targeting the 
micro-places that disproportionately generate public safety problems. However, lost in 
these findings is the fact that hot spots policing varies greatly in scope. For example, 
studies included in Braga and colleagues’ (2014) systematic review incorporated a 
diverse set of tactics including situational crime prevention (Braga & Bond, 2008), 
proactive traffic stops (Sherman & Rogan, 1995b), raids on drug houses (Sherman & 
Rogan, 1995a), collaborative problem-solving with businesses and/or residents 
(Taylor, Koper, & Woods, 2011; Weisburd & Green, 1995), directed motor vehicle 
patrol (Taylor et al., 2011), and foot patrol (Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, Groff, & Wood, 
2011), among others.
In addition, street-level actions enacted by police officers can exhibit a great deal of 
variability even within single interventions. Police officer actions are not situationally 
dictated, as research suggests as much as 37% to 86% of a patrol officer’s shift com-
prises “uncommitted time” not spent on responding to calls for service, making arrests, 
or engaging in other administrative duties (Famega, 2005). Hence, officers enjoy a 
great deal of latitude when choosing how to address incidents of concern, with a num-
ber of appropriate enforcement decisions available in most instances (Schafer, Carter, 
Katz-Bannister, & Wells, 2006). While such observations have typically been made in 
the context of general patrol deployment, hot spots policing seemingly provides a 
similar amount of leeway to officers. For example, following an inspection visit dur-
ing the Minneapolis Hot Spots Policing experiment (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995), 
George Kelling reported witnessing a range of police officer activities, with some 
officers “reading newspapers or sunning themselves while sitting on the patrol car, 
while others were engaging citizens in friendly interaction in community-policing 
style” (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995, p. 634).
The findings of Sherman and Weisburd (1995) raise an interesting question. The 
experiment generated significant crime reductions while placing no emphasis on the 
nature of police activity within hot spots. More recent place-based policing efforts 
have similarly generated significant crime reductions without emphasizing specific 
officer behaviors (e.g., Novak, Fox, Carr, & Spade, 2016, p. 468). This suggests the 
possibility that the visible presence of police and minimally invasive contacts with the 
community may matter as much as formal law enforcement activities. Recent studies 
also suggest the joint importance of officer presence and enforcement actions. For 
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example, while Ratcliffe et al. (2011) reported formal foot-patrol officer actions such 
as pedestrian stops, vehicle stops, and arrests as process measures, they argued that the 
presence of patrol officers operated as a “certainty-communicating device” by which 
increased certainty of punishment is communicated to potential offenders. Ratcliffe 
et al. (2011, p. 823, Footnote 19) further acknowledged that informal, community-
oriented activity, which does not readily lend itself to reporting, may have contributed 
to the crime reduction. Telep et al. (2014) conducted an experiment in which police 
patrols were shifted to different hot spots every 15 min in Sacramento. While the 
authors emphasized that their study did not seek to evaluate precisely what officers did 
in hot spots, findings of prior research suggests that a time frame of 15 min does not 
afford a great amount of time for officers to enact enforcement activities. Particularly 
relevant to the Sacramento experiment, Wu and Lum (2016) found that police officers 
in Jacksonville, Florida, spent an average of 40 min on each proactive enforcement 
activity. This suggests that officer presence and guardianship were likely the key pre-
ventive mechanisms in the Sacramento hot spots experiment (Telep et al., 2014).
Such research findings suggest a prevention mechanism through which police offi-
cers de-emphasize formal enforcement in favor of conspicuous presence and more infor-
mal community engagement. Nagin et al. (2015) described such an approach as the 
sentinel role of police. While Nagin et al. (2015) did not empirically test their theoretical 
model, recent research provides support for the sentinel role. Ariel, Weinborn, and 
Sherman (2016) tested the effect of patrol by uniformed civilian police staff with few 
arrest powers and no weapons (i.e., a purely sentinel role) in hot spots. The “soft patrol” 
by civilians was associated with 39% less crime and 20% less calls-for-service in target 
areas as compared with control areas, suggesting that crime reductions in hot spots are 
not contingent on “hard” police power. Furthermore, a recent systematic review and 
meta-analysis of Broken Windows interventions found the strongest program effect 
sizes were generated by community and problem-solving interventions while aggressive 
order maintenance strategies dependent on traditional law enforcement activities did not 
generate significant crime reductions (Braga, Welsh, & Schnell, 2015).
Despite such research findings, it should be noted that police adhering to traditional 
law enforcement activities has been shown to generate significant crime control ben-
efits, specifically when focused at high-crime places. The Kansas City Hot Spots 
Patrol experiment mandated that officers enact proactive motor vehicle and pedestrian 
stops in target areas, specifically in search of illegal firearm carrying, which generated 
significant reductions in gun crime (Sherman & Rogan, 1995b). In an experiment pair-
ing directed police patrol with proactive closed-circuit television monitoring, Piza 
et al. (2015) found that increased levels of enforcement in response to observed inci-
dents of concern generated significant reductions in violent crime and social disorder. 
Rosenfeld et al. (2014) found that proactive arrests and traffic enforcement generated 
significant reductions in nondomestic firearm assaults. Additional support for enforce-
ment manifests when contrasting two experiments conducted in Philadelphia (Groff 
et al., 2015; Ratcliffe et al., 2011). While Ratcliffe et al. (2011) found that foot patrol 
generated significant crime reductions at hot spots, Groff et al. (2015) found that foot 
patrol was not associated with any changes in crime occurrence. These divergent 
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results may be at least partially attributed to different enforcement levels, with the 
rookie officers included in the foot-patrol experiment (Ratcliffe et al., 2011) generat-
ing increases in arrests, pedestrian stops, and vehicle stops and the veteran officers 
assigned to the foot-patrol condition in the police tactics experiment (Groff et al., 
2015) not generating any increases in enforcement. Groff et al. (2015) suggested that 
this discrepancy in enforcement activity may explain foot patrol’s differing effect on 
crime across the two experiments.
A review of the literature suggests “what exactly police should be doing in crime hot 
spots remains an open question” (Haberman, 2016, p. 489). While individual studies 
have compared the use of different police strategies within individual jurisdictions (Groff 
et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2011), questions regarding police officer actions were not 
addressed. While overall strategies were established in hot spots, police officers may 
have enacted different actions in carrying out the strategy. For example, a given officer 
assigned to a directed patrol detail may most often arrest suspects when probable cause 
exists while another officer may use her or his discretion to use less punitive remedies to 
crime occurrence. The current study contributes to the literature by analyzing the effect 
of individual police officer actions on violent crime. Data come from the NPD’s 
Operation Impact, a saturation foot-patrol intervention. As per the typical approach of 
place-based policing research, the classification of Operation Impact as a foot-patrol 
intervention seems straightforward. However, this classification does not account for the 
varying activities that the police officers conducted on a daily basis. The current study 
isolates the effect of these disparate officer actions on daily levels of violent crime.
Method
Study Setting
Newark is the largest city in New Jersey, spanning over 26 square miles with a popula-
tion of nearly 280,000 persons according to the last decennial census. The percentage 
of residents living below the poverty level (29.7%) is nearly 3 times that of New Jersey 
as a whole (10.8%). Ethnic minorities largely comprise Newark’s population with 
52.4% of the population Black and 33.8% of residents identifying themselves as 
Hispanic or Latino (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The city has historically struggled 
with issues of gun violence. Internal police department data indicating that from 2007 
to 2010 over 84% of murders resulted from a gunshot would while roughly half of all 
robberies involved a firearm (Piza & O’Hara, 2014, p. 698).
Following the election of Cory Booker, Newark’s first new mayor in nearly three 
decades, and the appointment of new police leadership in mid-2006, the NPD under-
went a significant change in its overall strategy and mission. In their analysis of organi-
zational changes within the NPD, Jenkins and DeCarlo (2015) found the aforementioned 
change in police leadership led to increased emphasis on increasing the number of 
police contact with citizens on the street, with supervisors and officers universally 
acknowledging the importance of combating street-level quality-of-life and drug mar-
ket issues. In this vein, proactive enforcement aimed at street-level disorder and the 
illicit narcotics trade became the agency’s primary strategy against violence.
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Replicating an NYPD intervention of the same name (Smith & Purtell, 2007), 
Operation Impact launched in June 2008 and epitomized the NPD’s place-based 
approach to crime prevention. On a nightly basis, 12 police officers under the supervi-
sion of three supervisors patrolled the quarter-square-mile Operation Impact target 
area on foot (see Figure 1). Operation Impact represented a drastic increase in police 
presence within the target area, as Newark’s police sectors (which averaged approxi-
mately 3-square-miles in size) were typically patrolled by two police officers (Piza & 
O’Hara, 2014, pp. 693-694). A select group of officers were assigned to Operation 
Impact upon graduation from the police academy and remained detailed to the inter-
vention until graduates from the ensuing academy class were selected as their succes-
sors. Supervisors were selected based on their levels of experience managing proactive 
enforcement units, such as “Gangs” or “Narcotics.”
During foot patrols, officers were instructed to identify and disrupt street-level con-
ditions that leadership believed may generate violent crime, such as social disorder 
and illicit narcotics activity. Given the emphasis on proactive activity, official enforce-
ment actions were expected to take place on a frequent basis during the intervention. 
However, NPD commanders also recognized that, given their daily presence within 
the target area, foot-patrol officers could (and should) conduct additional activities to 
Figure 1. Operation Impact target area and catchment zone.
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address criminogenic conditions. To readily collect such data, Operation Impact com-
manders created a custom after-action report measuring non–law enforcement actions 
(referred to as guardian actions in the current study) conducted by officers each shift. 
It is important to note the nature of the Operation Impact officer activities differed 
from standard patrols on two dimensions. First, Operation Impact officers were not 
tasked with regularly responding to citizen calls for service, except when all patrol 
cars assigned to the encompassing police sector were “out of service.” Rather, the 
foot-patrol officers were expected to engage in proactive activities for the vast major-
ity of their shifts. Second, official law enforcement actions were the benchmark com-
manders used to assess the performance of standard patrol officers. The guardian 
actions collected as part of Operation Impact were not systematically recorded by any 
other unit in the NPD, meaning that such data were not referenced in department-wide 
performance accountability sessions such as CompStat.
Foot patrols were conducted 7 days a week between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 2:00 
a.m. to coincide with times during which violence was at its peak. An evaluation by 
Piza and O’Hara (2014) supported the overall strategy of Operation Impact, though 
with some important caveats. The analysis found that overall street violence as well as 
the disaggregate categories of murder, shootings, and nondomestic aggravated assault 
significantly decreased in the target area absent any displacement effects. However, 
robbery suffered from substantial levels of both temporal and spatial displacement, 
showing Operation Impact to have differentially affected the various types of street 
violence.
Data Sources and Analytical Strategy
Data for this project focused on Operation Impact’s 53-week implementation period 
spanning from June 5, 2008, to June 10, 2009. While Operation Impact lasted approxi-
mately 2 years, severe cuts in the department’s budget caused a steady decline in the 
scope and dosage of the initiative beginning in the third quarter of 2009, in anticipa-
tion of pending police officer layoffs. The 53-week period represents the time when 
Operation Impact ran at full strength and is thus the most appropriate study period 
(Piza & O’Hara, 2014).1
Crime incident data were measured from the NPD’s Records Management System 
(RMS). To tailor the analysis to the type of street-level behavior targeted by Operation 
Impact, incidents not likely to be influenced by the intervention strategy (domestic 
assaults occurring indoors and student fights on school property) were excluded from 
the study, following the approach of Piza and O’Hara (2014). The analysis included 
three specific crime types: aggravated assault, murder, and robbery. The crime types 
were combined into a composite “Violent Crime” category to capture overall levels of 
violence. “Robbery” was included on its own as a crime category given its prevalence. 
“Assault and Murder” were included as a single category in light of murder’s sparse 
occurrence (only two murders occurred in the target area during the study period). For 
each of three crime categories of interest, separate models were conducted to analyze 
three distinct temporal periods: 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. (Operation Impact’s operational 
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period), 2:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (the nonoperational period), and a full 24-hr period 
(i.e., the entire day). This series of analyses was repeated twice: once measuring crime 
in the Operation Impact target area and once in the surrounding catchment zone for the 
purpose of measuring spatial displacement.
The independent variables in each model were the enforcement actions and guard-
ian actions conducted by the Operation Impact officers. Officer actions were measured 
via after-action reports submitted by the foot-patrol officers upon the conclusion of 
each night’s shift. Field sergeants then summed the individual officer activities to pro-
vide cumulative totals of daily activity within the Operation Impact target area. The 
use of after-action reports allowed for the measurement of the less formal proactive 
police activities that typically are not measured in police data systems (Wu & Lum, 
2016). In total, the after-action reports captured daily counts of seven unique officer 
actions: arrest, field interrogations, quality of life summonses, citizen contacts, busi-
ness checks, bus checks, and taxi inspections. These activities are different in nature, 
varying in their degree of severity and emphasis on traditional law enforcement. These 
differences were accounted for in the analysis through the operationalization of police 
activity categories, as described subsequently.
Arrests, field interrogations, and quality of life summonses were jointly considered 
“Enforcement Actions.” The data did not allow for the identification of arrest charges. 
However, given the proactive nature of Operation Impact and the emphasis on disrupt-
ing social disorder and narcotics-related activity, it can be assumed that the majority of 
arrests were of a low-level nature (i.e., misdemeanor arrests). Quality of life sum-
monses are citations issued for behaviors commonly referred to as social disorder in 
the literature, such as drinking in public, gambling in public, and aggressive panhan-
dling. Field interrogations refer to situations in which officer approaches a citizen due 
to reasonable suspicion of crime activity, as per the standards established by Terry v. 
Ohio (1968). For each field interrogation conducted, police officers submitted a stop 
report that articulates the reason for the stop.
Citizen contacts, business checks, bus checks, and taxi inspections were jointly 
considered “Guardian Actions” for the analysis. Similar to field interrogations, citizen 
contacts involve the interaction between police officers and citizens in the field. 
However, citizen contacts refer to incidents in which the contact was made for non-
criminal reasons. In particular, the NPD asked the foot-patrol officers to build a rap-
port with the community by introducing themselves to citizens within the target area 
and explaining the purpose of the foot patrols. Citizen contacts also included instances 
in which citizens initiated contact with officers for purposes besides crime reporting. 
Business checks referred to incidents in which officers would enter a business to make 
contact with the employees and management on hand. Business checks allowed offi-
cers to build a rapport with the business community, similar to the goal of the citizen 
contacts, while also generating visible police presence in the vicinity immediately 
surrounding the business. Bus checks and taxi inspections involved the officers 
approaching these vehicles while they were stationary (e.g., at a red light, while 
parked, or otherwise idle) and making contact with the drivers and passengers. The 
goal of these inspections was similar to the business checks: They 
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allowed for informal interaction between the foot-patrol officers and citizens, created 
opportunities for detection of criminogenic situations, and increased police presence 
in a targeted fashion. In the case of taxi inspections, this activity was informed by 
frequent robberies of taxi drivers during the preintervention period. Guardian actions 
are distinguished from enforcement actions due to their less punitive nature and 
emphasis on nonintrusive police presence, which fall within the scope of what Nagin 
et al. (2015) label as sentinel activities of police.
Last, a number of control variables were included to account for factors unrelated 
to Operation Impact that may have influenced crime occurrence. Enforcement actions 
(arrests, field interrogations, and quality of life summonses) conducted within the tar-
get area by NPD officers not associated with Operation Impact were collected from the 
RMS. Unfortunately, guardian actions were not systematically collected by the NPD 
outside of Operation Impact. However, while it is probable that units such as narcotics, 
gang, and vice conducted operations in the area, Operation Impact foot-patrol officers 
were the only proactive personnel deployed within the target area on a daily basis. 
Thus, motor vehicle patrol officers provided the only other daily presence in the area. 
Given that the motor vehicle patrol officers were primarily tasked with responding to 
citizen calls for service and taking action in response to observed crime events, their 
activity likely comprised of mostly enforcement actions. To control for officer activity 
occurring during the previous day, lagged 1-day variables were included for the NPD 
enforcement, as well as the Operation Impact enforcement and guardian actions. Two 
covariates were included as controls for features of weather that may influence street-
level behavior. For each day, the median temperature and total inches of precipitation 
(rain or snow) were collected from the history archives of the Weather Underground 
website (www.wunderground.com/history). A binary variable measured whether each 
day fell on a weekend (Friday-Sunday) to reflect the heightened risk of crime during 
these days of the week (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics of all variables).
Units of analysis were the 371 days included in the study period to reflect the 
NPD’s daily focus on proactive police activity. A series of logistic regression models 
were conducted to measure the effect of the enforcement actions and guardian actions 
on crime occurrence. In each model, the dependent variable was a binary measure 
reporting whether a crime occurred during the day in question (“1”) or not (“0”).2 To 
account for their different levels of occurrence, and to allow an easier comparison of 
their respective effects on the dependent variable, police activity variables were stan-
dardized to account for their different frequencies.
Results
Results of the analyses are reported below for each of the crime categories included in 
the study. Table 2 displays the results of the violent crime models. In the target area, a 
one-unit increase in guardian actions was associated with a 51% decreased likelihood 
of violent crime occurrence during the 24-hr period and a 58% decreased likelihood of 
violent crime occurrence during the operational period. No variables achieved statisti-
cal significance in the catchment zone model.
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Table 3 displays the results of the robbery models. In the target area, a one-unit 
increase in the guardian actions was associated with a 52% decreased likelihood of 
robbery occurrence during the 24-hr period and a 51% decreased likelihood of violent 
crime occurrence during the operational period. Lagged enforcement actions 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Crime Counts, Officer Actions, and Control Variables.
Variable M SD Minimum Maximum Sum
Dependent variables: Crime counts (target area)
 Violent crime
  24-hr period 0.20 0.45 0 3 74
  Operational period 0.10 0.30 0 1 36
  Nonoperational period 0.10 0.33 0 3 38
 Robbery
  24-hr period 0.13 0.36 0 2 49
  Operational period 0.06 0.23 0 1 21
  Nonoperational period 0.08 0.27 0 2 28
 Assault and murder
  24-hr period 0.07 0.25 0 1 28
  Operational period 0.05 0.24 0 2 18
  Nonoperational period 0.03 0.16 0 1 10
Dependent variables: Crime counts (catchment zone)
 Violent crime
  24-hr period 0.21 0.50 0 3 79
  Operational period 0.10 0.33 0 2 37
  Nonoperational period 0.11 0.34 0 2 42
 Robbery
  24-hr period 0.13 0.36 0 2 49
  Operational period 0.05 0.22 0 1 19
  Nonoperational period 0.08 0.28 0 2 30
 Assault and murder
  24-hr period 0.08 0.29 0 2 30
  Operational period 0.05 0.24 0 2 18
  Nonoperational period 0.03 0.18 0 1 12
Independent variables
 Enforcement actions 9.15 6.29 0 43 3,393
 Guardian actions 27.58 26.31 0 197 10,231
Control variables
 NPD enforcement 5.00 4.77 0 27 1,855
 Median temperature 55.22 17.96 13 87 NA
 Precipitation (inches) 0.19 0.62 0 5.68 NA
 Weekend (Friday-Sunday) 0.43 0.50 0 1 NA
Note. NPD = New Jersey Police Department.
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conducted by NPD officers outside of Operation Impact were associated with higher 
robbery occurrence in the target area during the nonoperational period (OR = 1.47). A 
similar relationship was observed in the catchment zone during the operational period, 
with a one-unit increase in lagged NPD enforcement actions associated with a 69% 
increased likelihood of a robbery occurring.
Table 4 displays the results of the assault and murder models, which produced far 
fewer significant findings than the prior models. During the nonoperational period, a 
one-unit increase in NPD enforcement actions was associated with a 72% increased 
likelihood of crime occurrence within the target area. No other variables achieved 
statistical significance in the target area or catchment zone models.
Table 2. Violent Crime Logistic Regression Findings.
Variable
24-hr period Operational period Nonoperational period
OR SE p OR SE p OR SE p
Target area
 Enforcement actions 0.98 0.14 .91 0.82 0.14 .26 1.17 0.20 .36
 Guardian actions 0.49 0.11 .00** 0.42 0.12 .00** 0.67 0.16 .10
 NPD enforcement 1.29 0.18 .06 1.33 0.26 .15 1.28 0.20 .11
 L.enforcement actions 0.78 0.11 .07 0.78 0.13 .14 0.77 0.15 .18
 L.guardian actions 0.87 0.13 .35 0.83 0.13 .23 0.87 0.20 .53
 L.NPD enforcement 1.29 0.19 .09 1.19 0.23 .37 1.31 0.24 .13
 Median temperature 0.94 0.14 .68 0.81 0.17 .31 1.06 0.18 .71
 Precipitation 1.00 0.11 .97 0.96 0.12 .73 1.00 0.15 .98
 Weekend 0.77 0.22 .37 0.88 0.33 .73 0.65 0.24 .24
N 370 370 370  
Log likelihood −164.65 −107.96 −113.88  
Wald χ2 16.33 16.68 10.04  
Pseudo R2 .05 .07 .04  
Catchment zone
 Enforcement actions 0.75 0.13 .09 0.65 0.16 .08 0.81 0.16 .29
 Guardian actions 0.89 0.14 .45 0.74 0.21 .29 0.98 0.15 .91
 NPD enforcement 1.01 0.14 .93 0.83 0.13 .26 1.13 0.20 .48
 L.enforcement actions 1.10 0.17 .53 1.06 0.18 .72 1.13 0.22 .53
 L.guardian actions 0.81 0.14 .21 0.92 0.22 .71 0.72 0.15 .11
 L.NPD enforcement 1.22 0.16 .14 1.34 0.22 .08 1.04 0.17 .79
 Median temperature 0.89 0.14 .46 0.90 0.20 .63 0.84 0.15 .33
 Precipitation 0.99 0.11 .93 1.06 0.14 .66 0.95 0.12 .69
 Weekend 0.69 0.20 .21 0.84 0.33 .66 0.54 0.20 .10
N 370 370 370  
Log likelihood −166.77 −108.84 −120.31  
Wald χ2 13.66 10.56 13.24  
Pseudo R2 .03 .04 .03  
Note. All police activity variables were standardized to account for their differing levels of occurrence. “L.” prefix prior 
to a variable denotes that the variable measures activity for the lagged 1-day period. OR = odds ratio; NPD = New 
Jersey Police Department.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01.
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Table 3. Robbery Logistic Regression Findings.
Variable
24-hr period Operational period
Nonoperational 
period
OR SE p OR SE p OR SE p
Target area
 Enforcement actions 1.15 0.18 .39 0.90 0.19 .61 1.30 0.24 .17
 Guardian actions 0.48 0.13 .01** 0.49 0.18 .05* 0.60 0.17 .07
 NPD enforcement 1.28 0.20 .11 1.65 0.36 .02* 1.02 0.21 .93
 L.enforcement actions 0.75 0.13 .09 0.92 0.16 .64 0.61 0.17 .07
 L.guardian actions 0.88 0.16 .46 0.77 0.14 .16 0.92 0.25 .75
 L.NPD enforcement 1.49 0.23 .01 1.29 0.27 .22 1.47 0.24 .02*
 Median temperature 1.02 0.19 .90 0.98 0.28 .96 1.04 0.22 .84
 Precipitation 0.99 0.13 .93 1.06 0.16 .71 0.86 0.20 .50
 Weekend 0.54 0.19 .08 0.64 0.32 .37 0.56 0.25 .19
N 370 370 370  
Log likelihood −130.04 −75.07 −90.36  
Wald χ2 20.48 16.05 17.22  
Pseudo R2 .02 .07 .07  
Catchment zone
 Enforcement actions 0.75 0.15 .14 0.48 0.20 .07 0.89 0.18 .57
 Guardian actions 0.88 0.17 .51 0.56 0.21 .13 1.05 0.17 .78
 NPD enforcement 1.04 0.17 .81 0.68 0.15 .08 1.20 0.22 .32
 L.enforcement actions 1.11 0.17 .49 1.08 0.23 .74 1.17 0.21 .38
 L.guardian actions 0.82 0.15 .27 1.00 0.31 .99 0.78 0.14 .15
 L.NPD enforcement 1.25 0.19 .13 1.69 0.35 .01** 1.10 0.20 .60
 Median temperature 0.84 0.15 .33 0.91 0.28 .76 0.81 0.16 .28
 Precipitation 0.99 0.11 .90 1.02 0.16 .88 1.04 0.12 .77
 Weekend 0.63 0.21 .17 0.63 0.33 .38 0.54 0.24 .16
N 370 370 370  
Log likelihood −134.18 −67.37 −98.42  
Wald χ2 13.14 21.22 10.05  
Pseudo R2 .03 .10 .03  
Note. All police activity variables were standardized to account for their differing levels of occurrence. “L.” prefix prior 
to a variable denotes that the variable measures activity for the lagged 1-day period. OR = odds ratio; NPD = New 
Jersey Police Department.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01.
Discussion and Conclusion
The current study sought to contribute to the ongoing debate regarding police officer 
actions during place-based interventions. Cumulative results suggest that guardian 
actions conducted by the foot-patrol officers were associated with significantly 
decreased likelihoods of overall violent crime and robbery occurrence within the tar-
get area. Every 1-unit increase in guardian actions was associated with a between 51% 
and 58% decreased likelihood of crime occurrence during the Operation Impact opera-
tional period and a between 51% and 52% decreased likelihood during the 24-hr 
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period. Enforcement actions of the foot-patrol officers did not achieve statistical sig-
nificance in a single instance. This suggests that the guardian actions conducted by the 
foot-patrol officers were more impactful than the enforcement actions.
It should also be noted that the enforcement actions conducted by NPD officers unas-
sociated with Operation Impact may have generated negative effects within the target 
area. Findings suggest that the NPD enforcement actions may also have contributed 
somewhat to the spatial and temporal displacement detected in the evaluation of Piza and 
O’Hara (2014). Lagged NPD officer enforcement actions were associated with 69% 
increased likelihood of robbery in the catchment zone during the operational period. NPD 
enforcement may have also contributed to temporal displacement, with one-unit increases 
Table 4. Assault and Murder Logistic Regression Findings.
Variable
24-hr period Operational period Nonoperational period
OR SE p OR SE p OR SE p
Target area
 Enforcement actions 0.75 0.17 .21 0.83 0.23 .50 0.76 0.34 .54
 Guardian actions 0.58 0.20 .12 1.03 0.29 .92 1.06 0.39 .88
 NPD enforcement 1.24 0.25 .29 0.93 0.22 .76 1.72 0.38 .02*
 L.enforcement actions 0.82 0.16 .30 1.03 0.26 .90 1.09 0.22 .69
 L.guardian actions 0.86 0.27 .64 0.82 0.24 .51 0.68 0.31 .39
 L.NPD enforcement 0.93 0.19 .72 0.88 0.24 .63 0.90 0.31 .77
 Median temperature 0.81 0.16 .29 1.01 0.30 .98 1.22 0.26 .36
 Precipitation 1.05 0.14 .74 1.08 0.19 .66 1.25 0.19 .15
 Weekend 1.33 0.57 .50 1.05 0.58 .93 1.25 0.84 .74
N 370 370 370  
Log likelihood −84.02 −65.25 −41.98  
Wald χ2 14.51 4.16 29.54  
Pseudo R2 .05 .01 .09  
Catchment zone
 Enforcement actions 0.77 0.19 .28 0.83 0.23 .50 0.71 0.20 .41
 Guardian actions 0.88 0.22 .62 1.03 0.29 .92 0.65 0.29 .33
 NPD enforcement 0.95 0.18 .77 0.93 0.22 .76 0.96 0.27 .89
 L.enforcement actions 0.97 0.26 .91 1.03 0.26 .90 0.87 0.49 .81
 L.guardian actions 0.74 0.22 .32 0.82 0.24 .51 0.63 0.41 .48
 L.NPD enforcement 0.87 0.17 .49 0.88 0.24 .63 0.89 0.25 .67
 Median temperature 1.04 0.23 .88 1.01 0.30 .98 1.06 0.33 .85
 Precipitation 0.94 0.20 .78 1.08 0.19 .66 0.11 0.18 .17
 Weekend 0.87 0.35 .72 1.05 0.58 .93 0.68 0.41 .53
N 370 370 370  
Log likelihood −96.73 −65.25 −48.58  
Wald χ2 5.01 4.16 4.93  
Pseudo R2 .02 .01 .08  
Note. All police activity variables were standardized to account for their differing levels of occurrence. “L.” prefix prior 
to a variable denotes that the variable measures activity for the lagged 1-day period. OR = odds ratio; NPD = New 
Jersey Police Department.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01.
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associated with a 72% increased likelihood of assault and murder in the target area during 
the nonoperational period. Piza and O’Hara (2014) suggested that visible activity of offi-
cers within the Operation Impact target area may have contributed to displacement by 
providing offenders opportunities to relocate their criminal activities to nearby places 
and/or hours immediately preceding/following the operational period. However, Piza and 
O’Hara (2014) were referring to the foot-patrol officers and not patrol officers unassoci-
ated with Operation Impact, a suggestion not supported by the findings of the current 
study. It should also be noted that the activity of the NPD patrol officers is much more 
reactive than the activity of the foot-patrol officers in the target area. Therefore, the NPD 
enforcement findings may be more reflective of patrol officers responding to crime rather 
than their activity generating crime. This also highlights the limited crime prevention util-
ity of reactive police units, as compared with proactive units such as the Operation Impact 
foot-patrol officers. In particular, given that proactive units are primarily tasked with dis-
rupting street-level situations that can foster crime, they may more readily prevent crime 
than officers who primarily respond after crime occurrence.
When interpreting study findings, the reader should be aware of certain limitations 
inherent in the data and research design. Operation Impact was a very localized inter-
vention tailored toward specific crime- and agency-related factors in Newark. In par-
ticular, the NPD devoted a very large amount of resources to the target area, with the 
12 foot-patrol officers deployed nightly representing 6 times the number of officers 
typically deployed per shift within police sectors, which on average are 3 to 4 times 
the size of the Operation Impact target area. Therefore, the dosage of guardian actions 
delivered during Operation Impact may be very dissimilar to policing efforts in other 
contexts. The composition of the Operation Impact personnel is also unique, with the 
foot patrols comprised entirely of recent graduates from the police academy. While 
this reflected the approach of the original implementation of Operation Impact by the 
NYPD (see Smith & Purtell, 2007), as well as foot-patrol operations in Philadelphia 
(Ratcliffe et al., 2011) and Kansas City (Novak et al., 2016), it is important to note that 
such heavy reliance on rookies may have affected the study findings. Such a situation 
was observed in Philadelphia, with rookie foot-patrol officers in one intervention 
(Ratcliffe et al., 2011) generating greater levels of enforcement and crime reduction 
than veteran foot-patrol officers in another (Groff et al., 2015).
In addition, while after-action reports provide the benefit of recording police actions 
not typically captured in official databases (Wu & Lum, 2016), they also have some 
potential drawbacks. In particular, the guardian actions (business checks, citizen con-
tacts, bus checks, and taxi inspections) were self-reported by foot-patrol officers and 
not verifiable by supervisors, given that the data are not recorded in any databases of 
the agency. While there is no reason to believe that officers systemically falsified 
information on their after-actions reports (as supervisors actively reviewed, and 
approved, the reports at the conclusion of each shift), it is possible that different offi-
cers may have different perceptions of what constitutes a specific guardian action 
(e.g., what one officer considered a citizen contact another officer may have consid-
ered a quick greeting from a pedestrian) and thus may report their activity in differen-
tial manners. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the data used in this study are quite 
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dated, from nearly a decade ago. This is largely due to limitations of common police 
measures, with the type of guardian actions included in this study typically not readily 
captured in police databases. This required the author to collect, code, and digitize 
hard copies of after-action reports submitted by the foot-patrol officers. Such data col-
lection activities are not always feasible in applied research. Nonetheless, researchers 
should seek to replicate this study using more recent data.
Despite these noted limitations, findings of the current study have important policy 
implications for contemporary policing. Since the Professional Era of the early-to-mid 
1900s, American Policing has been defined by a warrior mind-set whereby police 
view themselves primarily as “crime fighters” (Rahr & Rice, 2015). As such, enforce-
ment actions (e.g., arrests, citations, stops, etc.) are largely considered the benchmark 
for measuring officer productivity under the guise that such actions generate reduc-
tions in crime (Sparrow, 2015). The current study adds support to recent arguments 
that proactive policing operations can incorporate less punitive officer actions without 
compromising effectiveness. Indeed, findings of the current study echo those of recent 
research supporting less invasive police actions (Ariel et al., 2016; Braga et al., 2015).
The emphasis on guardian actions over enforcement actions may be particularly 
appealing in light of recent events in American policing. The constitutionality of tradi-
tional enforcement actions, in particular, pedestrian stops and terry pats (i.e., stop 
question and frisk), has come under legal scrutiny. Perhaps nowhere has this issue 
been more publicly on display than in New York City, with the U.S. District court rul-
ing that stops conducted by NYPD officers routinely violated the legal standards 
established by the Fourth Amendment of the constitution (Floyd et al. v. The City of 
New York, 2013). A similar issue was found in Newark, with the DOJ finding that stops 
conducted by NPD officers similarly violated constitutional standards (U.S. 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2014).
Outside of the legality of police enforcement actions, aggressive law enforcement 
tactics run the risk of damaging police–community relations. It should be noted that 
the lone experimental test of hot spots policing’s potential backfire effects found that 
aggressive order maintenance had no significant impacts on citizen perceptions of 
police legitimacy (Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega, & Ready, 2011). However, upon closer 
review of the study methodology, this randomized experiment may have low external 
validity, which scholars have noted in prior field experiments of policing (Eck, 2006) 
as well as in public policy research in general (Orr, 2015). During the controlled exper-
iment, police officers administered an aggressive order maintenance strategy for 3 hr 
per week at each target area over a 6-month period. Such a low dosage likely does not 
reflect intense place-based strategies as they are typically implemented by police, 
especially in high-crime cities. For example, intervention activities took place over 8 
hr per day within Newark’s Operation Impact target area. NYPD’s version of Operation 
Impact occurred on a similarly frequent basis (Smith & Purtell, 2007). In addition, 
officers in the Weisburd et al. (2011) study were instructed to primarily use warnings 
against persons observed acting disorderly, with enforcement actions reserved for 
repeat offenders and/or cases with aggravating circumstances (Weisburd et al., 2011, 
p. 305). This may not reflect standard practice, as police leaders often encourage 
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enforcement actions not only due to the belief that they prevent crime but also because 
they offer a means of easily measuring officer productivity (Sparrow, 2015). Indeed, 
research focusing on established police practices, rather than field experiments, shows 
that aggressive enforcement actions can seriously damage police/community relations 
and perceptions of police legitimacy, particularly when such practices are applied in an 
unfocused manner (Fratello, Rengifo, Trone, & Velaquez, 2013; Rengifo & Fowler, 
2016). In addition, a more recent field experiment of hot spots policing found that resi-
dents exposed to directed patrols experienced reported reductions in perceptions of 
procedural justice and trust in police as compared with residents in areas assigned to 
problem-solving or control conditions (Kochel & Weisburd, 2017).
Given the potential drawbacks of aggressive enforcement, and the fact that less 
intrusive actions can generate comparable crime control benefits in certain contexts, 
police should consider more readily incorporating guardian actions into hot spots 
policing interventions. However, in the interest of generating more robust knowledge 
on the subject, researchers should continue to test the effect of such guardian actions, 
especially as compared with enforcement actions, through rigorous research. 
Researchers should capitalize on opportunities to conduct experimental tests of the 
relative effect of these actions in the field. One could envision such a study whereby 
officers deployed within specific hot spots utilize enforcement actions during their 
tours of duty while a different set of officers deployed within alternate hot spots can 
utilize guardian actions. To facilitate such a study, and minimize the threat for con-
tamination, police officers with differing roles, responsibilities, and powers can be 
used to create various experimental conditions. For example, Ariel et al. (2016) found 
that the deployment of uniformed civilian police staff with minimal enforcement pow-
ers reduced crime and calls for service in target areas compared with control areas. 
Future research can compare the activity of such officers with an alternate treatment 
condition in which police officers employing more aggressive enforcement tactics 
operated within crime hot spots. To ensure generalizability of obtained results, such 
field experiments can be designed in a manner that ensures sample units are suffi-
ciently similar to units that would permanently receive the treatment postexperimenta-
tion (see, for example, Tipton & Peck, 2016).
Future empirical tests should also seek to uncover any interaction effects between 
guardian actions and enforcement actions. Said differently, when both types of actions 
are conducted simultaneously, the observed effect of one action may be at least par-
tially bolstered by the occurrence of the other. In addition, while guardian actions may 
help build rapport with the community, it is possible that citizens may not be comfort-
able with such increased contact with police. In addition to exploring crime prevention 
effects, future research on guardian actions should also strive to better understand the 
nature of such police/community contacts and the subsequent impact on citizen satis-
faction with police and perceptions of police legitimacy. Another important aspect of 
Operation Impact, and proactive policing in general, relates to patrol saturation levels. 
As previously discussed, the 12 foot-patrol officers deployed nightly represented a 
drastic increase in police presence, which begs the question of whether fewer officers 
deployed per shift could have generated similar crime reductions. Future research on 
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hot spots policing may be able to shed light on such questions by randomly assigning 
different numbers of officers within various target areas to identify and determine 
whether any significant differences in effect were observed. In sum, given the track 
record of hot spots policing, researchers should move beyond testing whether such 
interventions generate crime reductions by focusing on the underlying mechanisms 
that may contribute to such effect.
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Notes
1. While it would have been interesting to incorporate the entire 2-year period as the study 
period, allowing for a test of how resource reductions affected crime occurrence, officer 
activity data were only readily available for the first 53 weeks of the intervention. To 
review, officer activity data were reported at the conclusion of each shift via paper after-
action reports. While these reports were faxed to the NPD’s Operations Bureau on a daily 
basis, they were never systematically digitized or entered into any centralized database. 
To conduct this analysis, the author had to create and manually enter the information from 
each after-action report into a database. Given time and resource constraints, the author 
was only able to review after-action reports for the first 53 weeks, to reflect the study 
period of the original Operation Impact evaluation (Piza & O’Hara, 2014).
2. Given that Operation Impact tours crossed midnight (i.e., occurred in two separate days), 
it is helpful to discuss the operationalization of the binary variable at this point. Each 
day’s nonoperational period was considered as temporally subsequent to the operational 
period. Said differently, the operational period was considered as the 8-hr period of 6:00 
p.m. to 1:59 a.m. and the nonoperational period was considered the subsequent 8-hr period 
(2:00 a.m. to 5:59 p.m.). Data were coded in this manner to reflect that NPD’s emphasis 
on having officers identify and disrupt criminogenic situations as they occur. Therefore, 
the nonoperational period reflects the point of the day after the foot-patrol officers “left,” 
theoretically providing potential offenders increased opportunities for crime by reducing 
the levels of formal surveillance.
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